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Abstract 
 
This paper uses firm level data from all the textile producing regions in India to 
examine the relation between wages, unionization and labour productivity. We find 
that fewer workers were employed per machine in the unionized mills in Bombay and 
Ahmedabad, as compared to non-unionized regions implying that low labour 
productivity was not due to union resistance to increased work intensity. Our findings 
suggest that while low wages in India encouraged overmanning, higher wages, 
prompted by unionization, had productivity enhancing effects. We explore alternative 
explanations for low labour productivity, arising from the managerial and institutional 
structure of Indian cotton mills.  
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1. Introduction 
The effect of unionization on labour productivity has been debated in the 
context of industrialized economies. Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue that unions 
can increase labour productivity by reducing labour turnover and improving 
managerial practices. Recent work suggests that presence of unions can increase 
productivity by making mangers more keen  to reduce organizational slack. (Metcalf 
2003)  The empirical evidence is mixed. Research using data from American 
industries show that unions had a positive effect on labour productivity (Brown and 
Medoff 1978, Clark 1980, Allen 1986) The evidence from the UK provides less clear 
cut answers. (Machin 1991). Recent work suggests that multi-unionism has had a 
negative effect on productivity in the UK (Bean and Crafts 1996), while in Germany 
cooperative practice through work councils tend to have a more positive effect on 
productivity. (Metcalf 2003)    
The empirical evidence for less developed countries is scarce. Indian cotton 
mills in early 20th century provide an interesting case of unionization. Labour strife 
was common in Bombay from the late 19th century, although not always organized by 
unions. Bombay was one of the two major cotton textiles producing regions and saw 
early unionization. Wolcott and Clark (1998) attribute the divergent trajectory of 
wages and productivity between Japan and India after 1910, to the failure to increase 
labour productivity in Bombay cotton mills. Japanese workers increased their work 
effort over time and consequently earned higher wages. The presence of a non- 
unionized female workforce is seen by Wolcott (1992) an important factor in Japanese 
success. Analyzing firm-level data from Bombay, Wolcott and Clark (1998) attribute 
the persistence of low productivity to worker resistance to higher effort. Prescott and 
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Parente (1999) use the Bombay textile mills as an example of inefficient work 
practice following unionization. 
This paper re-examines the effect of unionization on labour productivity using 
a data set of cotton mills from all the textile producing regions in India in early 20th 
century. This is the first time such a data set is being analyzed. Labour unions were 
important in the main two textile producing regions, Bombay and Ahmedabad.  
Labour strife in these regions provides an interesting contrast with other textile 
regions, where unions were less important. We do not have evidence on union 
membership or strikes at the level of the firm. However, as union presence differed 
from region to region, the regional effect allows us to test if labour productivity was 
lower in the regions with union activity. 
I analyze firm-level data to compare Bombay with the rest of India. My 
measure of labour productivity is labour- use per machine. This captures total factor 
productivity if machines are the same in cotton mills across all regions.2 My empirical 
finding suggests that labour productivity was higher in regions where labour unions 
were important and wages were high. This questions the Clark and Wolcott view that 
low labour productivity in Bombay cotton mills was a result of worker militancy and 
is in line with the empirical literature in developed countries that unionization may 
reduce organizational inefficiency.  
The cities of Bombay and Ahmedabad had the largest concentrations of cotton 
mills in 1910. Both regions were located within the provincial boundary of the 
Bombay Presidency in Western India. The daily employment figures show that until 
the mid 1920s, Bombay had three times  as many workers as Ahmedabad. By 1930 it 
the difference had narrowed significantly. (Textile Labour Enquiry Committee, 1937-
                                                 
2 Firms all over India imported their equipment from a few British firms. Clark 1987 also finds this to 
be the case at the international level in 1910. 
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38)  Both cities saw large wage increases during the First World War, but the two 
cities had very different experiences of labour movement. In Ahmedabad industrial 
arbitration and peaceful settlements were the norm after 1922. The Bombay cotton 
mills saw organized resistance to wage cuts in the 1920s.  
If worker resistance prevented an increase in productivity, then the mills of 
Bombay would have higher labour use per machine in comparison to other textile 
producing regions, where union activity was lower. An interesting comparison would 
be with Ahmedabad, where workers and management cooperated to set wages in the 
1920s following Gandhi’s leadership. The statistical exercise in this paper suggests 
that Bombay had a lower level of labour use compared to other regions over the 
period 1910 to 1933, which was statistically significant. Ahmedabad also had a lower 
labour use per machine, but this was significantly higher than the levels in Bombay in 
1929 and 1933.  The differences are observed at the end of a decade long conflict 
between the worker and the management in Bombay cotton mills. Surprisingly the 
two regions were not very different before the World War, but both had lower labour 
use per machine compared to other regions. What was common between Bombay and 
Ahmedabad was relatively higher wages. Thus the empirical finding suggests that 
higher wages encouraged lower labour use per machine or higher labour productivity. 
Comparisons of money wages in Bombay, Ahmedabad and Calcutta find that money 
wages rose sharply in the first two cities after 1914. Although the wages rate was 
comparable in the three cities before that, by the 1920s money wages diverged with 
Bombay and Ahmedabad pulling ahead. This trend is also reflected in the real wages 
although real wage in Calcutta was higher before the war. (See Figure 1) This 
increase in part reflects the increased demand for cotton textiles as imports fell during 
the war and the shortage of labour.  
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Labour militancy is not the only cause of higher wages.  Wages can rise in the 
economy due to other factors. The effect on labour efficiency would be similar. The 
above argument may explain the productivity differential between India and Japan. 
Japan saw rapid economic growth after 1870. Rising incomes and wages in Japan 
compelled managers to raise labour productivity to stay competitive in the 
international market for textiles. Both comparisons indicate that high wages and 
worker efficiency are correlated. In this paper, I will argue that causality flows from 
wages to productivity.  
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
organization of the industry and the factors that may explain high labour use per 
machinery.  Section 3 presents an empirical analysis of firm-level data to quantify 
labour use in different regions. Section 4 presents a simple model of wage- effort 
trade off. Section 5 explores the role of institutions in causing organizational slack 
and inefficient labour use.  Section 6 analyzes the link between wages and labour 
productivity using comparisons with Japan. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Organization in cotton mills:  
2.1 Background 
The cotton textile industry was mainly an import substituting activity, 
competing with imports from Lancashire. The first cotton mills were set up in 
Bombay. Initially the main output was yarn for the domestic handloom industry and 
for export to the Chinese market. Over time, spinning mills bought their own looms 
and began producing cloth. The advantages the industry enjoyed were cheap labour 
and local supplies of raw material. The industry had a unique management structure. 
A managing agent was responsible for organizing production. This agent raised 
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capital and managed the financial side of the business for a commission. Production 
was left in the hands of technical supervisors and labour supervisors known as the 
jobbers, who were locally recruited. The agents mostly came from the merchant class 
and had little technical training. The majority of the agency directors were Indians, 
who had made money in the cotton and opium trade and moved into industry as 
profits in trade began to decline. (Vicziany, 1975) Table 1 shows the background of 
the directors and of technical staff in Bombay. The managing agents relied initially on 
the men from Lancashire for the technical side of production. Over the years, Indian 
technicians filled this important gap. However these technicians knew little about the 
labour market, which was left to the jobber or the labour recruiting agent.  
The process of hiring workers was complicated. India had abundant labour, 
but mainly concentrated in agricultural activity. The industry had to draw its labour 
from the rural hinterland. The task was assigned to the jobbers, who typically came 
from the same social background as the labourers and used their rural connections to 
recruit workers for the textile mills.  The demand for labour fluctuated due to 
fluctuations in demand in the product market. About one-fifth of the labour in 
Bombay cotton mills was employed on a daily basis. (Chandavarkar, 1994: 82) The 
jobbers were given the responsibility of maintaining adequate labour supply to suit the 
level of demand. The production managers often did not have a common language of 
communication with the mill workers. It was the jobber who was assigned the task of 
worker management and supervision and to implement factory discipline.  
The system encouraged high labour turnover as the jobber exercised control 
over a readily available group of casual workers. (Morris, 1965, Chandavarkar 1994) 
However, it also allowed quick reductions in employment if the need arose. 
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2.2 Choice of technology and labour productivity 
The production process reflected the abundance and cheapness of labour. 
Although the ring was also more suited to unskilled labour, the Indian cotton mill 
industry adopted the mule. Saxonhouse and Wright (1984) find that the persistence of 
the mule in India and Russia was due to the use of short staple cotton, which was the 
variety produced in India.  Japan and Brazil used long staple cotton and adopted the 
ring much earlier. An alternative view emphasized the lack of technical knowledge of 
the managing agents and the presence of British technical personnel as the cause of 
India’s failure to switch to ring spinning. (Kiyokawa, 1983) Other research in this 
field suggests that the Indian entrepreneurs made a rational choice in adopting the 
mule given the factor endowments. Capital was expensive and the mule was relatively 
cheaper, at least until 1890. The cost of setting up a cotton mill was 35% higher in 
India compared to a Britain. Once a mill was set up, the machinery was operated as 
long as possible and replacement was deferred, with repairs and replacement of parts. 
The lower rate of scrapping and replacement of machinery delayed the rate of 
adoption of rings, since rings could be adopted only as mules were scrapped.  
Consequently mules persisted in Bombay longer than elsewhere. 
High labour use was a response to factor prices. Tasks became more labour 
intensive per unit of capital. Each mill produced a variety of yarn depending on 
demand. The mule allowed greater flexibility in operation. Short staple cotton broke 
more frequently. The machines were often operated at a speed higher than the 
recommended level without introducing the appropriate quality cotton. (BMOA 
Report 1928) These increased the need to have more men per machine. It was 
estimated that a ringsider in India had to deal with nine times as many breakages per 
 9
100 spindles as his American counterpart. (Chandavarkar, 1994: 284) One survey 
estimated that in the 1930s, for every worker employed in a month, two casual 
workers were available. (Chandavarkar, 1994: 296) 
The Tariff Board in 1927 saw high labour use per machine as an 
organizational problem. (BMOA Report 1928): 
“We cannot too strongly emphasize that no increase in outturn per operative 
can be reasonably expected unless they are provided with proper raw material. There 
undoubtedly exists a tendency in India to spin higher counts of yarn from cotton than 
the quality of cotton warrant. This reduces production, is injurious to quality and 
increases the work of the operative in both spinning and weaving by the large number 
of breakages.” 
 
 
2.3: The labour movement 
The labour movement in Bombay and Ahmedabad were mainly concerned 
about wages. Spontaneous protests by textile workers in Bombay had been a part of 
the industry from the beginning.  The early protests started in one mill and spread to 
others. The wave of strikes in 1900-01 came in response to wage cuts in twenty mills 
when 20, 0000 workers went on strike for ten days. (Morris, 1965) Wages rose 
dramatically during the war. Two factors contributed to this: The rise in demand for 
labour and the rise in the cost of living. The mills paid a war bonus of 10% from 1917 
to be followed by a “dear food allowance” of 15% from 1918. (Kooiman, 1989: 51-
52) As the war-time boom gave way to a recession, firms attempted wage cuts that led 
to strike action. 150,000 workers struck work for 12 days in 1919 followed by a 
general strike in 1920 that lasted for a month. (Morris, 1965: 178-79)  
This period coincided with economic nationalism in the anti-imperialist 
struggle. While workers in Bombay adopted a militant approach, with Gandhi’s 
involvement workers in Ahmedabad sought consensual solutions through industrial 
arbitration. Workers in Ahmedabad struck work in 1923 against an attempt to reduce 
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wages. Nevertheless, the industry implemented a  wage cut of 15% and for the rest of 
the decade, wages were negotiated through dialogue.( Patel, p32) In 1925 in Bombay, 
strikes began as the Bombay Millowner’s Association (BMOA hereafter) announced 
wage cuts.( Bombay Labour Office, 1926) The city witnessed a general strike that 
lasted several weeks. By this time the trade unions had establishes a strong presence 
in Bombay cotton mills and coordinated worker resistance.  The strikes were 
coordinated with the involvement of the jobbers. As several cotton mills in Bombay 
sought to introduce a higher work load, the Communist union organized industrial 
action in 1928 that lasted for over six months. (Morris, 1965:181-83)  
The average wage in Bombay was 20% higher than the average wage in 
Ahmedabad on the eve of the First World War. Between 1914 and 1921, wages rose 
by 87% in Bombay city and by 122% in Ahmedabad. (Bombay Labour Office, 1923) 
The rise in earnings in Bombay city was below the average for Bombay Presidency. 
The rise in the cost of living in Bombay and Ahmedabad were similar. The fast 
increase in the average wage in Ahmedabad reflected the increase in demand from the 
domestic market as supply of British goods was disrupted. At the same time, the 
workers ready to leave the city due to a plague epidemic when and were paid bonuses 
to stay on.  
Table 2 shows a comparison of wages in the two cities and the rest of India in 
1929. Clearly the difference in wages between Bombay and Ahmedabad was 
marginal, but these figures were higher than what was paid to workers in other textile 
producing regions. 
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3. Empirical Analysis: 
Did resistance from labour unions prevent an increase in labour productivity? 
One way to analyze the role of unions in preventing organizational change would be 
to compare the labour- capital ratio across different regions in India. If organized 
labour resistance was important in influencing work norms, Bombay should have had 
a higher use of labour per machine compared to other regions. On the other hand, if 
union activity mainly increased wages and higher wages forced employers to initiate 
productivity increases, one should find that Bombay had higher labour productivity 
and fewer workers per machine.  A comparison with Ahmedabad would be of interest 
as the two regions had different experiences of labour resistance. Did militancy hinder 
organizational change in Bombay as has been suggested by Wolcott and Clark? Did 
cooperation rather than conflict lead to efficiency gains?  
 
3.1. The data 
My data covers all the textile producing regions in India. The data is at the 
level of the firm and provide information on the number of workers employed daily in 
each firm and the machinery in use. The latter is available by category, i.e.  mules, 
rings and looms. The data is for the years 1889, 1910, 1917, 1929 and 1933. Firm-
level information for 1889 is being used for the first time and allows us to go back to 
the period when worker resistance had yet to make an impact on the industry. 1929 
and 1933 are of particular interest as these follow a decade of labour strife.  
 Table 3 shows the use of capital and labour in cotton mills in different 
regions. My focus is on Bombay relative to Ahmedabad and the rest of India. Bombay 
had the highest concentration of cotton mills in 1889, while Ahmedabad was still 
marginal.  By 1910 both cities had roughly the same number of mills. Ahmedabad had 
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a large share of rings as newer were more likely to adopt the ring, while older firms in 
Bombay with an existing capacity of mules were slow in switching to rings. 
Ahmedabad also had more looms. These firms produced finer quality yarn and cloth 
and competed with British imports. Bombay on the other hand produced more of 
lower count yarn and exported to the Chinese market.  
The average size of mills in Bombay was larger. By 1917, the changes in 
Bombay are noticeable. The switch to rings and looms was well underway. There was 
also an increase in the average size of the mill.  The change that affected Bombay was 
the loss of the Chinese market and the change in competition after the war. These 
mills faced increased pressure to reorganize with the changes in the product market. 
Several mills went out of business by 1929 and more disappeared by 1933. For 
Ahmedabad, on other the other hand, there is evidence of increase in size as well as 
new entry and these firms benefited from the changes in the product market. 
 
3.2: The Analysis 
From the data we can estimate coefficients of labour use by type of the 
machine over time. The dependent variable, labour use per day, is regressed on the 
number of mules, rings and looms within a firm. To allow for the possibility that 
labour in a particular region, Bombay or Ahmedabad, is systematically less (or more) 
efficient, a dummy variable for the region is interacted with each of the machinery 
variables. That is, our regression takes the form:  
 Nit = βm (1 + γBDi + µADi )Muleit +  βr (1 + γBDi+ µADi )Ringit  
                         +   βl (1 + γ BDi + µADi)Loomit + εit, 
where Nit is employment in firm i in year t, Muleit is the number of mules used by the 
firm in this year, etc., and BDi is a dummy variable that takes value 1 of the firm is in 
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the Bombay region and ADi is a dummy variable that takes value 1 of the firm is in 
the Ahmedabad region We estimate this equation for each year separately, that is we 
allow the coefficients β, γ and µ to vary across years. As this equation is non-linear in 
the parameters, the estimation is by non-linear least squares.  Our interest is in the 
values of γ, that is, the extent to which labour requirements in Bombay differ from 
other regions.  
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients from the regression. We see that   γ 
is estimated to be negative in every single year. Although this is not statistically 
significant in 1889, the coefficient is significant in subsequent years. Indeed, in 1929, 
labour in Bombay is 48 per cent more efficient than labour in the other regions of 
India. Labour in Ahmedabad is also more efficient than in other regions, but less 
efficient than in Bombay. A t-test shows that the coefficient for labour use in Bombay 
is significantly different from the coefficient for labour use in Ahmedabad for the 
years 1929 and 1933, but not in the 1889, 1910 and 1917. 
This result is striking. The 1920s strikes took place in response to reduction in 
employment as the industry struggled to maintain profits after the war. In 1929 after a 
decade of organized labour resistance, the productivity of Bombay textile workers in 
relation to their Ahmedabad counterparts was high. The difference between the two 
cities had narrowed by 1933. Clearly in other regions of India where the workers were 
less militant, the labour- use ratio was higher. 
These findings question the Wolcott –Clark view that workers’ resistance to 
increases in labour productivity in Bombay was the main cause of over manning.  The 
results suggest that the relatively higher wages in Bombay and Ahmedabad required 
higher labour efficiency (See table 2 to compare wages). This encouraged firms to 
economize on wage costs so as to remain competitive in the product market. Higher 
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wages forced the Bombay entrepreneurs to increase work intensity in cotton mills and 
reduce labour use per machine. Several inefficient firms went bankrupt as shown by 
the decline in the number of firms in the region. This finding though contrary to the 
work by Wolcott –Clark, is in line with the empirical literature on industrialized 
countries that suggests that unions can remove managerial slack and increase 
efficiency. 
Although the money wage difference between Bombay and Ahmedabad was 
marginal, the productivity difference in 1929 was large. This is puzzling. However, a 
closer examination suggests that the product and factor markets in the two cities were 
very different. Consequently, the pressure on entrepreneurs in Bombay to reduce 
inefficiency was greater. Mills in Bombay relied on the export markets in yarn and 
were hit hard as they lost overseas markets after the war. Ahmedabad on the other 
hand produced higher quality yarn and cloth and benefited more as Britain lost market 
share in India. Simple calculations of profits of the firms in the two cities show that 
profits fell faster in Bombay.(Patel, 1987: 34) Bombay mills had a high turnover of 
the workforce and a large proportion were casual workers estimated to be about 28% 
of the workforce.(Chandavarkar, 1994: 296) This made it relatively easier to reduce 
employment.  Evidence from the wage census shows that absenteeism among male 
and female time and piece-rate workers declined in Bombay between 1923 and 1926, 
but stayed roughly the same for male workers in Ahmedabad and declined for both 
categories of female workers. (Bombay Labour Office, 1923, 1929)  
There is ample evidence in representations of firms in Bombay  to the Tariff 
Board that increased workload was seen as an alternative to wage cuts. One of the 
industry leaders, the firm of Sassoon, presented estimated of savings in total wage 
cost with increased workload even when wages increased. (Bombay Labour Office 
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1934) Estimates based on my data set show that Bombay saved in total wage cost as 
number of workers per machine declined.  Wage cost per unit of output in Bombay in 
1929 was 25% lower than that for the rest of India and 3% lower in 1933, while in 
Ahmedabad it was roughly 8% and 4% higher. (See table 5) These figures suggest 
that efficiency gains made by Bombay mills in the 1920s. The figure for 1929 for 
Bombay is not out of line with estimated savings projected for spinners by Sassoon 
between 46% and 62% depending on yarn count. Falling profits, older machinery and 
changes in the product market created additional pressure on firms in Bombay to 
bring about organizational change. To understand why firms had operated at sub-
optimal level and what prompted them to become more efficient, a simple model of 
wage effort trade off is useful. 
 
4. Wage- Effort Trade off: 
 Let e denote effort, and let us measure effort so that one unit of effort results 
in one unit of output. Let p denote the price of output, let k denote the capital 
requirement per worker, and r the interest rate. Let w denote the wage per unit of 
effort, so that the profits of the firm per worker  can be written as 
π= ep-w-rk   ……(1). 
Turning to the representative worker, let us assume that the utility of the 
worker, U, increases with the wage, but decreases with the disutility of effort, and can 
be written as 
U(w,e) = w – d(e)  …….(2), 
where the disutility of effort, d(e), is increasing and convex, so that the marginal 
disutility rises at higher levels of effort. 
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Fig. 2A graphs the typical indifference curve of the worker IC, corresponding 
to a given utility level. Let us now consider what effort choice would be a Pareto 
efficient arrangement, given the preferences of the worker and the production 
technology. To do this, we can graph the iso-profit curves of the firm. These are 
straight lines with slope p. An efficient arrangement corresponds to a point of 
tangency between the worker’s indifference curve and the iso-profit curve IP.   Thus 
e* is the efficient choice of effort in this context. 
There are of course many Pareto efficient arrangements, which can be ordered 
in terms of the extent to which they favour one party, say the worker. Thus some 
Pareto efficient arrangements give the worker higher wages and higher utility and the 
firm lower profits than the others. However, given our assumption of quasi linear 
utility, in all Pareto-efficient arrangements the effort level is the same and equals e*, 
and variations in worker utility are achieved entirely through the wage. Thus, even if 
the worker has some bargaining power, and gets a higher utility level than in a 
competitive labour market, an efficient bargain would imply that this increased utility 
is achieved not via reduced effort but solely through a higher wage. 
Let us now suppose that existing effort arrangements are inefficiently low, and 
are at a level e’ that is less than e*.  This is indicated in Fig. 2B.  Since this is Pareto 
inefficient, there is a way to make both the worker and the firm better off. This 
involves an increase in worker effort towards e*, where the worker is compensated for 
this by an increase in the wage. 
There are two possible explanations for the low effort levels of the worker in 
the Indian cotton mills. The first explanation, advanced by Wolcott and Clark (1998), 
is that low effort reflected worker preferences, so that arrangements were Pareto 
efficient. That is the, actual effort choices were in fact close to e*, so that it did not 
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make economic sense to increase effort.  Similar views had been voiced by 
managerial staff in the industry, policy makers and foreign observers from early days 
of the industry. The increase in effort level of cotton mill workers in Bombay with 
higher wages question such an interpretation. 
An alternative explanation is that actual arrangements were Pareto-inefficient; 
so that both workers and firms could be made better off by wage-productivity 
agreements, where the worker agreed to raise work effort in exchange for higher 
wages. For this latter explanation to hold, there must be a reason why the two parties 
failed to make a Pareto-improving trade. This failure is could be a failure of initiative, 
possibly based on a lack of information. For the two parties to make such an 
improvement, one of them must recognize the potential for mutual gain, and has to 
initiate the improvement. The specific institutional structure of management may 
have created inefficiencies in the system. Unions in this context may play an 
important role in moving to a more efficient arrangement. 
 
5: An Institutional Failure? 
 Hall and Jones (1999) show that institutional differences explain difference in 
labour productivity across countries. In the Indian context, it may be argued that the 
managerial structure in cotton mills made for certain inefficiencies. The three tiers of 
management created self contained spheres of function and resulted in information 
gaps. Madholkar documents the friction between the men from Lancashire and the 
managing agents and sees the presence of the jobber as the crucial factor in reducing 
the managing agent’s reliance on the technicians. The agents’ distrust of the 
technicians removed them from the sphere of decision making. The agent made 
decisions regarding the purchase of inputs and the technician was asked to produce a 
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certain output per machine. (Madholkar, 1969, ch 3) An additional reason might have 
been the incentives of the managing agents, who held overall responsibility for the 
organization. Right up to the turn of the 20th century, the managing agents’ returns 
depended upon the output of the firm rather than profits and provided relatively weak 
incentives to engage in cost reductions. Even when firms switched to commission on 
profits, the relevant category was total profits and not profits net of depreciation. 
The managerial structure and the factor prices also had implications for 
factory discipline, which is an important aspect of labour productivity. Thompson 
(1967) documents how new working habits were formed in Britain after the industrial 
revolution. Clark (1994) finds that greater discipline increased effort by 33% in 
Britain in the course the 19th Century. The change in length of a working day and 
increased effort at workplace was a result of a stringent system of penalties. 
Discipline was also a crucial aspect in the Japanese cotton mills. Hunter (2003) argues 
that dormitories were crucial in the evolution of factory discipline. The control of the 
management extended not just during working hours, but for the whole day. Workers 
were paid by piece rate and remuneration depended on quality and quantity.  
The Indian cotton mills did little to develop mechanisms for higher discipline 
on the shop floor to increase work intensity. A survey conducted by the Bombay 
Labour Office in 1926 documented the penalties imposed on workers for the first ten 
months. Information on dismissals is not available, but we do know how many 
workers were penalized. The table 6 is based on information collected from 45 mills. 
An overwhelming proportion of the fines for men and women were for negligence in 
work. This referred to spoilt or damaged material- their value was deducted from the 
workers wage. Weavers in particular were subjected to large penalties. (Pearse, 1930: 
89-90) Late arrival at work or taking time off during working hours were less serious 
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offences compared to failing to produce the right quality product. It has been 
suggested that this was a way to reduce the earnings of highly paid weavers. (Tariff 
Board 1927) Interestingly, the survey showed that in factories other than textiles, 49% 
of the fines were for breach of discipline. (BMOA Report, 1927) Morris documents 
the evidence presented to the Factory Commissions and argues that in the textile 
industry, although the formal system of rules was severe, regulation of work 
discipline was surprisingly lax. Workers drifted in at the start of work and gradually 
drifted away as the light began to fade. (Morris, 1965:111-112). Either supervisors 
were not concerned about work intensity or chose to ignore breaches of it. The latter 
could arise from the social relation between the worker and the jobber.  
The evidence from cotton mills in India suggests that the managers had less 
concern about factory discipline. Equipment costs were relatively high and the 
managers chose to economize on capital cost by running the machines as long as 
possible. The employers responded to worker absences by employing reserve labour 
to step in when needed. The low wages provided a reason for over manning rather 
than imposing greater discipline.  
The Indian entrepreneurs were slow to introduce an organizational change that 
was a feature of the Japanese industry. Unlike in Indian mills, where there was a 
separation between technical and managerial activity, Japanese firms had a more 
integrated approach. (Pearse, 1930) The Japanese entrepreneurs increased labour use 
per unit of capital through a system of double shift. The Indian mills persisted with of 
long hours of a single shift system. Arno Pearse, who studied cotton mills in different 
parts of the world, showed that mills working two shifts would reduce costs by 12%- 
13% on average. (Pearse, 1930) Longer hours also reduced efficiency.  
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As early as 1905, the BMOA discussed reduction of the working day to 12 
hours. Firms, such as Wadia, Sassoon and Petit, who were the industry leaders in 
introducing changes in work practices, argued that long hours reduced worker 
efficiency. (BMOA 1905) In 1919 Wadia moved to introduce two shifts of eight 
hours. However, BMOA voted against the introduction of double shifts. One of the 
arguments was that the city infrastructure would not be able to cope with an additional 
100,000-150,000 men required for the second shift. (BMOA reports, 1919-21) The 
reluctance to work double shifts could have been associated with greater costs of 
supervision and the high salaries paid to European technical staff. (Morris, 1965: 56-
7) Several millowners argued that mills on a double shift would bid up the wages and 
cause labour disputes in mills on single shift. (Chandavarkar, 1994: 353-354) The 
BMOA passed a resolution in 1920 prohibiting implementation double-shifts. Two 
firms that introduced a double shift were expelled in 1921. (BMOA, Report 1921) In 
his statement to the Industrial Disputes Committee, Wadia claimed that the 
introduction of double shifts had reduced absenteeism. (Indian Textile Journal, 
January 1922) However double shift did not become the norm until the 1930s. In fact 
the BMOA rescinded the resolution of 1920 to allow firms to do so. (BMOA, Report 
1928)  
The agency problems associated with the separation of financial and technical 
jobs in the cotton mills may explain the absence of organizational change. 
Consequently, rising wages were instrumental in increasing efficiency if firms were to 
remain competitive.  
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6. Wages & Labour Productivity: Cause & Effect?  
The correlation between wages and labour productivity can be found in the 
context of the divergence in productivity levels between India and Japan. Wolcott and 
Clark (1998) see low labour productivity as a determinant of low wages. However, 
this view is inconsistent with a competitive labour market, where textile workers were 
only a small fraction of the total workforce.  For example, in India, the entire 
industrial workforce was less than 10% of the total labour force and cotton textiles 
had an even smaller share. Thus the wages of cotton textile workers would not have 
been determined by the level of productivity in cotton textiles, but mainly by the 
general level of wages in the economy. If textile workers were substantially 
productive, this would mainly be reflected in higher profits, with only a small effects 
on wages. Alternatively, rising wages would require rising labour productivity if the 
firm was a price taker. 
 GDP per capita in Japan rose faster than in India. In 1870, GDP per capita in 
Japan was just over 35 per cent more than India’s per capita GDP, by 1913 Japan had  
twice the per capita income of  India and by 1950, three times as much Per capita 
GDP grew by 0.54% per year in India during 1870-1913, almost one-third of Japan’s 
growth rate of 1.48% per year. The corresponding growth rates in India and Japan 
during 1913-1950 were -0.22% and 0.89% respectively. (Maddison, 200: 264-5, 
Shivasubramoniam, 2000: 33) Money wages in Japanese cotton mills increased four 
times between 1903-07 and 1918-22. In Indian cotton mills, wages doubled during the 
same period. (See table 7) 
 
As wages increased in Japan, sectors producing tradable goods, such as cotton 
textiles, were compelled to increase labour productivity to stay competitive.  On the 
other hand, the Indian economy stagnated and wages did not rise much until the First 
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World War. The cotton mill entrepreneur faced little pressure for change and 
productivity increase. Table 6 shows the differences in wages and capital costs in 
India and Japan.  In India, the relative price of capital goods increased, whereas in 
Japan the relative price of capital goods declined continuously, creating the 
momentum for technological change. Wage driven labour productivity growth was 
not a factor in India until the 1920s. An Indian worker produced 0.75 pounds of yarn 
per hour in 1890-94, and this remained static at 0.73 in 1915-1919. In Japan, yarn per 
worker more than doubled, from 0.80 to 1.91 in the same years. (Wolcott & Clark, 
1998) 
Did India and Japan have similar levels of labour productivity before the 
divergence in wage trends? Clark (1987) finds that labour productivity in cotton mills 
in India and Japan was not very different in 1910. I use firm-level data from India and 
Japan to test the differences in labour use per machine around 1890. Data from 104 
Indian cotton mills in 1889 is combined with similar data from Japan, on 32 firms, for 
the year 1892 to assess how employment norms differed between the two countries 
very early in the process of industrialization.  
To analyze employment norms, we need to take into account the difference in 
shift work between the two countries.  Japanese firms introduced double shifts in the 
mid 1880s. By the early 1890s, most Japanese firms had adopted double shifts, while 
Indian firms had only one shift. I therefore divide employment in each Japanese firm 
by two in order to get the number of workers per shift in each country. I estimate the 
following regression, which is similar to the one estimated in section 3:   
 Ni = βs (1 + γ IDi) Spindlesi +   βl (1 + γ IDi) Loomi + εi, 
where Ni is employment in firm i, Spindlesi is the number of spindles used by the 
firm, and Loomi is the number of looms used by the firm. IDi is a dummy variable 
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that takes value 1 if the firm is located in India. This equation is estimated by non-
linear least squares. Our interest is in the parameter  γ, which measures the extent to 
which firms use more labour in India as compared to Japan.  
Table 8 reports the regression results. Indian firms used about 9% more labour 
than Japanese firms, but this effect is not statistically significant. This analysis is 
subject to a few caveats. We have relatively few Japanese firms in our sample. We 
have also assumed that all Japanese firms have switched to double shift – if there 
were some exceptions, this would imply that we have underestimated employment 
norms in Japan and thus the difference between the two countries would be less than 
the estimated 9%. We have assumed that spindles are homogeneous between the two 
countries although the Japanese firms had a larger share of rings. Subject to these 
caveats, our analysis indicates that there was at most a small difference in labour 
productivity between the two countries around 1890, and the divergence came later. 
By 1910, Japanese productivity levels were higher than the Indian levels, but lower 
than that in Britain. (Clark 1987) The divergence in productivity levels increased as 
wages rose in Japan.  
 
7. Conclusion  
This paper has argued that unionization and worker resistance cannot be an 
explanation for low labour productivity in the Indian cotton mills. On the contrary, the 
militancy of textile workers in Bombay made the cotton mills in this region relatively 
more efficient by increasing wages relative to other regions. Cotton mills in the cities 
of Bombay and Ahmedabad used less labour per machine. Both cities had higher 
wages in 1929 relative to other regions. While Bombay had seen several strikes over 
the decade, wages were set by arbitration in Ahmedabad cotton mills.  
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TABLE 1: SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MANAGERS IN BOMBAY COTTON 
MILLS 
 TECHNICAL 
PERSONNEL 
DIRECTORS 
1925 
 1895 1925 MERCHANTS TECHNICAL LAWYER 
PARSI 112 201 30 9 10 
HINDU 21 67 74 0 3 
MUSLIM 5 6 19 0 0 
JEWISH 3 11 6 0 0 
EUROPEAN 104 113 20 2 2 
Source: Rutnagur, 1927, pp 251-253. 
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TABLE 2: WAGE DIFFERENTIAL IN BOMBAY PRESIDENCY 1929 
(DAILY AVERAGE EARNING IN RUPEES) 
 BOMBAY AHMEDABAD SHOLAPUR BARODA OTHERS
MEN 1.45 1.39 1.00 1.03 1.00 
WOMEN 0.78 0.80 0.40 0.57 0.54 
ALL 
WORKERS 
1.26 1.24 0.80 0.95 0.87 
Source: Pearse, 1930,  p109. 
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TABLE 3: CAPITAL AND LABOUR USE IN COTTON MILLS 
 
 BOMBAY AHMEDABAD REST OF INDIA 
1889    
SPINDLES 29725 22423 26005 
LOOMS 252 212 20 
HANDS DAILY 996 779 884 
NO. OF FIRMS 53 7 104 
1910    
MULES 11133 1494 7888 
RINGS 23720 18648 20453 
LOOM 296 305 291 
HANDS DAILY 955 833 1101 
NO. OF FIRMS 79 72 208 
1917    
MULES 7591 781 5280 
RINGS 29433 20236 22873 
LOOM 724 391 480 
HANDS DAILY 1562 817 1175 
NO. OF FIRMS 77 82 231 
1929    
MULES 4637 494 2940 
RINGS 39812 21007 26670 
LOOM 994 464 584 
HANDS DAILY 1423 968 1213 
NO. OF FIRMS 75 111 286 
1933    
MULES 3636 177 2200 
RINGS 41930 24071 28642 
LOOM 1014 526 608 
HANDS DAILY 1863 1041 1367 
NO. OF FIRMS 67 128 298 
Source: BMOA Annual Reports for various years 
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TABLE 4: LABOUR USE: BOMBAY COMPARED TO OTHER REGIONS 
 1889 1910 1917 1929 1933 
NO OF FIRMS 99 208 231 286 298 
LABOUR USE 
PER MULE 
0.03 
(21.5) 
0.02 
(4.4)** 
0.01 
(4.8)** 
0.02 
(4.5)** 
0.02 
(5.2)** 
LABOUR USE 
PER RING 
 0.04 
(9.8)** 
0.04 
(19.2)** 
0.03 
(24.1)** 
0.03 
((31.0)** 
LABOUR USE 
PER LOOM 
0.82 
(8.4) 
0.7 
(4.1)** 
1.2 
(13.2)** 
1.2 
(14.8)** 
1.2 
(15.4)** 
DIFFERENCE IN 
LABOUR USE  
BOMBAY 
-0.41 
(0.9) 
-0.24 
(3.3)* 
-0.26 
(8.5)** 
-0.48 
(23.0)** 
-0.33 
(12.2)** 
 
DIFFERENCE IN 
LABOUR USE 
AHMEDABADa 
 -0.21 
(2.3)** 
-.30 
(8.4)** 
-0.22 
(7.08)** 
-0.25 
(7.7)** 
DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN 
BOMBAY & 
AHMEDABAD 
 -0.03 
(0.3) 
0.04 
(1.3) 
0.26 
(.8.9)** 
0.8 
(2.5)** 
R2 0.96 0.73 0.93 0.94 0.93 
Note: *Total spindles. Source: Reports of Bombay Millowners Association. 
** Statistically significant at 95 per cent. T- Statistic in parentheses. 
a The coefficient for Ahmedabad is not reported for 1889 as the number of firms is 
small. 
Source: BMOA Annual Reports for various years 
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TABLE 5: WAGE COST PER UNIT OF OUTPUT  
 REST OF INDIA BOMBAY AHMEDABAD 
1929 1.00 0.75 1.08 
1933 1.00 0.97 1.04 
 
Source: Tables 2 and 4.  
Note: The index is calculated using wages for men in 1929 and labour productivity 
coefficients for respective years. 
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TABLE 6: FINES FOR INDISCIPLINE OR INCOMPETENCE JAN-OCT 1926 
CAUSES FOR FINES NO. OF INSTANCES % SHARE 
BREACH OF 
DISCIPLINE 
21158 6 
BAD OR NEGLIGENT 
WORK 
300296 87 
DAMAGE TO 
EMPLOYER’S 
PROPERTY 
12881 4 
OTHERS 
 
9771 3 
TOTAL 344106 100 
Source: Pearse 1930, p89. 
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TABLE 7: CHANGES IN WAGES AND COST OF CAPITAL: 
JAPAN & INDIA 
 
YEARS JAPAN INDIA 
 CAPITAL 
GOODS 
PRICE 
INDEX 
MONEY 
WAGE 
INDEX 
FOR 
COTTON 
SPINNERS
RELATIVE
PRICE OF  
CAPITAL- 
LABOUR 
TEXTILE 
MACHINERY
PRICE 
INDEX 
MONEY 
WAGE 
INDEX 
IN 
COTTON 
MILLS 
RELATIVE
PRICE OF 
CAPITAL- 
LABOUR 
1903-
07 
100.0 100.0 1.00 100.0 100.0 1.00 
1908-
12 
103.7 125.6 0.83 106.2 112.5 0.94 
1913-
17 
131.8 148.8 0.89 196.3 130.7 1.50 
1918-
22 
258.74 429.8 0.60 336.6 219.5 1.53 
1923-
27 
232.0 525.1 0.44 242.1 252.3 0.94 
1928-
32 
174.8 465.1 0.38 204.9 265.19 0.77 
Source:  For Japan- Otsuka et al. Technology-Choice in Development, table 5.1, p68 
For India- Bagchi, Private Investment in India, p122 
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TABLE 8: LABOUR USE PER SPINDLE IN INDIA (1889) AND JAPAN (1892) 
 
No of firms: 104 (India) and 32 (Japan). 
 
WORKERS PER SPINDLE PERCENTAGE MORE LABOUR USE  IN 
INDIA  
0.025 
(12.4) 
 
9.4 
(1.0) 
Notes:   R2 = 0.96, T- statistic in parentheses. 
Source: Reports of Bombay Millowners Association for India and Cotton Spinners 
Federation, Japan.  
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Figure 1 A 
Money Wage in the Cotton Textiles Industry
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
19
00
19
03
19
06
19
09
19
12
19
15
19
18
19
21
19
24
19
27
19
30
19
33
19
36
19
39
Years
W
ag
es
Bombay
Ahmedabad
Jute in Calcutta
 
 
Figure 1 B 
Real Wages in Cotton Textiles Industry
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